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The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the most studied and talked about
problems in modem international affairs. From the earliest days of the
Mandate, a succession of voluminous official reports, white papers, and
serious partisan studies have emerged purporting to point the way
toward a solution. Since the 1967 war there has been no dearth of gov-
ernmental, congressional, and academic brainpower expended toward
the same end. Yet despite the impressive aggregation of analytic talent,
the problem still eludes solution, making it one of the oldest perma-
nent crises still with us. The problem itself is all too familiar-com-
peting nationalisms, holocaust, war, displacement of the Palestinians,
incursions, reprisals, belligerency, blockades, threats, more war, ap-
parently ad infinitum. No less familiar are all the options that have
been proposed over the years-binationalism, partition, internationali-
zation, compensation, repatriation, open waterways, arms control, truce
supervision, refugee relief, and peacekeeping. The familiarity of these
options has come to be matched only by their apparent sterility.
Thus when proposals come along that attempt to break new ground
and show some degree of creativity and imagination, they deserve seri-
ous scrutiny. Michael Reisman's eighty-eight page essay falls in this
category. His approach exemplifies what one may call a liberal per-
spective on the problem, as distinguished from the radical positions
found among many of the partisans, who call for a drastic altering of
the pre-1967 status quo in favor of one side or the other. Reisman's is
a breathtakingly sweeping approach. At a single stroke he cuts awvay
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all the past claims and counterclaims of the various parties.' He is sen-
sitive to the moral ambiguities of the situation and critical of the inter-
ferences of the outside powers. He sympathizes with the people, Jewish
and Arab, who have suffered injustices; and he has generally harsh
words for the leadership, particularly Arab, whose pettiness, parochial-
ism, stupidity, and destructive fantasies have exacerbated the crisis.
He predicates his discussion on an image of tie Middle East as "a
regional multipolar arena, which will continue to be unstable because
of fragmentary development and the ambitious and conflicting goals
of various national elites there."2 As the Middle East is a particularly
volatile part of the "global village" that we all inhabit, according to
Mr. Reisman, it is appropriate for the Great Powers to "help create
the conditions for minimum order in the region, to lower the level of
overt violence, to isolate or neutralize the initiators of unrest, and to
resolve the major moral and human problem-the plight of the Pales-
tine refugees-in the most equitable manner possible."3 Active partici-
pation by the big powers is important because they are already inex-
tricably involved in the conflict and because the local actors seem to
be unwilling or unable to make peace themselves. His solution is forth-
right: a Sinai development trust, a Druze trust territory in the Golan
Heights, a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and an "international"
statute for an Israeli-controlled Jerusalem. Having conceived the Arab-
Israeli problem in its larger dimensions-both international and social-
Reisman proceeds rationally to break it down into "manageable" sepa-
rate problems and then to apply his considerable ingenuity in inter-
national law toward a set of smaller solutions.
I. A General Critique
Despite its grandiose rhetoric, the essay is a serious effort to apply
novelty and ingenuity to the Arab-Israeli problem. It is not a propa-
ganda brief for the Israelis-although sometimes it reads like one; nor
is it just a safe rehash of old positions. Inventive as it is, however, I
think it fails as a viable solution to the crisis. The underpinning of the
Reisman proposals is a set of questionable assumptions about the area
and the situation. In some cases the assumptions themselves are un-
founded; in others the inferences drawn from them are incorrect. The
1. See M. REmSmAN, THE ART OF TMlE Posswrx: DIPLOMATIC ALTEP.NATWnES IN TrIlE )DLE
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overall result is a set of "alternatives" that is not consistent with the
realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
A. Reisman is right in acknowledging that the region is in flux but
he discounts one of the primary reasons for it-Arab nationalism. To-
day the Arab world is incoherent and divided, and its political leaders
are seemingly irrational. But there is logic to Arab behavior that any
analyst of the Arab-Israeli conflict must consider, which derives from
the persistent and powerful appeal to Arab nationalism. The aims of
pan-Arabism have been the return of Palestine to the Arab nation and
the destruction of deviationist regional state nationalism. Egypt under
Nasser from around 1955 to 1961 was considered by most Arabs to
be the vanguard of Arab unity, and Nasserite interference in other
regimes was widely approved. It may be easy to ridicule the movement
for its failures and chauvinism, but it is a mistake to derogate its hold
on elites and masses alike. The mistake is all the more serious because
political institutions are exceedingly fragile in the Arab world: elites
are constantly subject to the threat of sporadic, unstructured outbursts
of popular "participation" which can undermine local regimes of low
legitimacy. To underestimate Arab nationalism leads to the erroneous
conclusion that the locus of instability is in the political leadership,
and is the result of personal ambition'or irrationality.
B. The harsh blame Reisman places on established elites in the
Arab world indicates an assumption that they function in a political
vacuum, and ignores the significance of radical counter-elites and mass
public opinion as the primary "destabilizing" and militant forces in
the Arab states.
He suggests that the deficiencies of Arab leaders as individuals ac-
count for much of the problem: Nasser's pan-Arabism was a vision
of "personal imperialism"; 4 and "[i]t is neither Israel nor the United
States that hardens or softens the heart of Pharaoh; it is Mr. Arafat
and, increasingly, his own extremist fleas." 5 In this characterization,
Reisman reflects the regrettable tendency of Washington policymakers
to personalize the Middle East problem: "if only we could replace
Nasser our troubles would be over." Such statements are not altogether
wrong, but they are highly misleading. For Reisman, therefore, the
problem of keeping minimum order in the Middle East is to a large
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groups."' As for Israel, counter-elites are not seen to be a factor; but
public opinion is more potent than in the Arab world, and it is deeply
skeptical of the compromises which a United Nations or United States.
sponsored diplomatic settlement would require.
C. By starting with the precept that the Great Powers have a re-
sponsibility to create minimum order and neutralize unrest, Reisman
endorses a policeman function which the United States especially
should abjure. Furthermore, the conditions of instability in the Mid-
dle East are so pervasive-as the author himself rightly notes-that such
a role is as difficult and costly as it is morally questionable.
Reisman is not alone in using "instability" in a pejorative sense:
diplomats and international lawyers are professionally committed to
maintain and search for order. But Israel is willing and able to sacri-
fice an agreed settlement providing minimum order for its own vision
of national security; Egypt and the other Arab states directly involved
want their territorial integrity and security from future invasion first;
the Soviet Union may prefer minimum disorder to the extent that it
needs to solidify its impressive gains in the Arab world; and the Pales-
tinian resistance movement is the most categorical of all in rejecting
the idea of minimum order. The United States may be the only prin-
cipal party for which a solution involving agreed minimum order and
eventual peace is the highest priority; yet even Washington seems to
feel it may benefit from backing Israel's position. Instability in the
Middle East may be anathema to Mr. Reisman, but to important ele-
ments inside and outside the area, instability, if not a good in itself, is
a hopeful indicator of innovation and progress. These elements see the
Great Powers' "responsibility" for minimum order as neo-imperialism.
D. Reisman commits the fallacy of "separate packagism" in assum-
ing that the Middle East crisis is really a set of relatively distinct and
independent problems. To be sure, there are some reasons for support-
ing such an idea. The interests of the Palestinian refugees would seem
to be quite separable from those of states, and the political context of
Sinai is clearly different from Jerusalem. Egypt has indicated that it
might be interested in a separate accommodation with Israel over the
Suez Canal and Sinai even though it has also maintained that not one
inch of Arab territory will be sacrificed. Yet the feasibility of separate
packagism depends on the extent to which the various Arab actors are
6. P. 88.
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actually autonomous from one another. Reisman's defective vision of
the Arab world leads to a defective analytic strategy. To a far greater
extent than he suggests, the Arabs are aware of the indivisibility of
the Israeli challenge. On a tactical level, Arab diplomats perceive that
piecemeal solutions only weaken them further. Arab politicians and
the rising counter-elites exemplified by students and professionals tend
to feel the same way. Looking farther ahead, it is hard to imagine that
a set of separate solutions as proposed by Reisman, even if they all were
formally concluded, would bring minimum order: Arab claims to full
sovereignty in Sinai, Jerusalem, and Golan would hardly disappear,
regardless of what particular regimes decided; nor would the struggle
of the Palestinian resistance and their supporters be stilled. Conversely,
a powerful Israel would tolerate nothing less than effective control,
direct or indirect, in the conquered territories. The more likely result
-a "solution" on one or two issues only-would be even less satisfac-
tory. A separate deal between Egypt and Israel over Suez or even Sinai
might buy time, but in the long run it would prove untenable if the
questions of refugees, Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Golan remained
unresolved or ignored.
E. Finally, Reisman places considerable store in what one might
call the ethnic ploy. In emphasizing the local, fragmentary, and primor-
dial nature of political culture in the Arab East, he is in good com-
pany, for scholars are now beginning to appreciate more fully these
characteristics. This is one sociological issue with high political salience
because it challenges the myth of a dominant Arab political identity.
Thus Mr. Reisman finds it possible to suppose that if Egyptians, Pales-
tinians,7 and Druze8 can be given specific concessions to their particu-
laristic communities, then the generalized Arab hostility to Israel will
prove to have been a paper tiger. Whether or not Reisman's proposals
to strengthen parochial identities would indeed result in harmony is
presumably not relevant to the strategic issue: for even if conflict per-
sisted it would be deflected away from Israel, toward inter-Arab quar-
rels-Druze against Sunni, Palestinian against Jordanian, Egyptian
against all other Arabs. The ethnic ploy is of course a logical derivation
7. On the plight of the Palestinians, still without a national-state a quarter.century
after the initial resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, see pp. 44.49, and
the text of that resolution at 102-29.
8. There are about a quarter-million Druze living in Syria, Lebanon and Israel. They
have existed as a distinct religious sect for almost a thousand years, but have never de.
veloped a national or ethnic political movement. On Reisman's proposal for a Druze
Trust Territory see pp. 1252-53 infra.
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of the image of a highly-fragmented Arab political culture. But if, as
I have suggested, the factor of common Arab identity and nationalism
has been incorrectly minimized, then the utility of the ethnic ploy is
correspondingly reduced.
II. Reisman's New Perspective and Current Realities
To tell whether Mr. Reisman's proposals are good examples of the
"art of the possible," we should examine them in the context of post-
1967 diplomacy and politics in the Middle East. U.N. Resolution 242
of November 22, 19679 has served as the touchstone of all serious efforts
to settle the Arab-Israeli crisis since the June war. It calls for "[w]ith-
drawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent
conflict" in return for guarantees of freedom of navigation through
international waterways, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and
the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state
in the area through measures including establishment of demilitarized
zones. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union were
signatories of the resolution, their subsequent disagreements over its
interpretation paralyzed its effective implementation, continually frus-
trating the efforts of Ambassador Jarring.
In late 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers elaborated the Amer-
ican understanding of a comprehensive settlement within the terms of
the Resolution: territorial adjustments were to be "insubstantial," uni-
lateral action by any party on Jerusalem was unacceptable, and a per-
manent peace was to be sought that would take into account the aspi-
rations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments
involved. As if to underline its commitment to the "evenhandedness"
first declared by Governor William Scranton in 1968, the United States
delayed action on Israel's request for more Phantom fighter-bombers.
Then in June 1970 Mr. Rogers initiated the successful United States
proposal for a cease-fire along the Suez Canal, and in October 1971
raised the possibilities of an interim, partial settlement over Suez be-
tween Egypt and Israel. These American efforts were well-conceived
and the Suez cease-fire was a notable success. But the United States
failed to use its influence to begin to implement the substance of the
U.N. Resolution and Rogers' proposals. Despite compelling strategic
reasons to reach a settlement, American policymakers made haste very
slowly. Why they allowed their promising initiatives to stagnate is a
9. Reprinted at pp. 157-58.
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complex question: doubtless domestic Jewish influence was a serious
impediment. But possibly more important was a distorted strategic
vision of the Middle East-carefully nurtured by the Israelis-that a
stronger "Greater Israel" was the only possible bulwark against the
Soviet threat. One suspects that this unrealistic realpolitik was con-
centrated in the White House and the CIA, while some officials in the
State Department and the Defense Department saw correctly that the
crucial problem of United States policy vis-4-vis the Russians was to
regain the confidence, if not the friendship, of Arab elites and public
opinion.
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was consolidating its expensively-pur-
chased gains in the Arab world by pledging complete solidarity in the
diplomatic struggle and supplying carefully-limited amounts of essen-
tially defensive military aid. Moscow's interpretation of the U.N. Reso-
lution was explicitly pro-Arab, and varied from the American interpre-
tation: it insisted on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab
territories occupied in 1967. Israel's deep penetration raids over Egypt
beginning in January 1970 led to a new commitment of Soviet assist-
ance in the form of SAM antiaircraft missiles and a further enlarge-
ment of the Soviet contingent of military advisors. With American-
made aircraft killing Egyptian civilians, the situation was ideal for the
expansion of Soviet air and naval facilities. Finally, in May 1971 the
Soviets concluded a fifteen-year friendship treaty with Egypt. The So-
viet government remained committed to a peaceful settlement, but it
seemed clear after four years that it was not in as much hurry as the
United States to reach a settlement. The Soviets seemed willing to risk
new explosions in order to continue to make marginal gains at Ameri-
can expense.
I have already suggested that the Reisman proposals rest on certain
faulty assumptions about Middle Eastern political culture and proc-
esses. How appropriate are they in light of the complex and am-
biguous maneuvers of the Great Powers toward a settlement? Reis-
man's indictment of the diplomats is blunt: "Unknowingly, our pres-
ent peacemakers are programming the next war. The challenge of crea-
tive diplomacy is how to avoid it."10 We are told that the perspectives
of the Great Powers are "childlike in their egocentricity"; that they are
"muscle-bound" and incapable of exerting significant influence over
their clients. Nevertheless, he writes, the superpowers are deeply in-
volved and share important common interests in opening the Suez
10. P. 9.
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Canal and controlling a local arms race that could all too easily lead
to nuclear conflict and a confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
A new perspective is needed, and Reisman proposes one with four
points: (1) the goal of peace should give way to minimum order; (2)
the integrated nature of Middle East problems should be questioned;
(8) the rhetoric of imposed versus indigenous solutions must be
scrapped; and (4) the need for political and social invention must
be recognized. 11
The fourth point is hortatory: nobody will object to creative think-
ing on the Middle East. Nor is there any quarrel with the third point;
Reisman is correct in noting that the Powers are engaged to the hilt
on all sides. But that is quite obvious. Only the militants-Israelis and
Palestinians-have articulated this false dichotomy and opted for an
"indigenous" solution. Reisman's second point is fair enough: the in-
tegrated nature of the crisis is worthy of reexamination, but as I have
tried to suggest above his interpretation is seriously misleading. Thus
the "separate packages" approach he advocates is probably inadequate.
The first point, however, reveals the essence of the "new perspec-
tive," and behind its appealing modesty lies a mischievous conception.
How sensible to argue the futility of comprehensive solutions, perma-
nent settlement, and regional peace that Mr. Rogers has tried so val-
iantly to promote! None will gainsay Reisman's comment that the area
is likely to experience chronic instability with or without Israel, no
matter what the Great Powers do. But Reisman underplays the enor-
mous turmoil that the Arab-Israeli conflict has generated in the area
and its repercussions for Great Power confrontation. It would be better
to grasp the nettle of this difficult but clearly defined source of ten-
sion than to pursue the chimera of minimum order by constructing
machinery for shoring up the present unstable status quo. Behind the
rhetoric of a new perspective lurks a rather pedestrian diplomatic
vision: the legitimation of the Arabs' territorial and political defeat.
Ironically, a minimum-order perspective would, if put into effect, un-
doubtedly perpetuate the very condition it designed to alleviate-maxi-
mum disorder. In the post-1967 situation, Reisman's perspective is in
effect a set of technical measures-trusteeships, development schemes
and the like-for solidifying the position of Greater Israel. "Greater"
not through continued direct rule in the conquered territory, but
through the neutralization there of Arab nationalism. In all fairness,
11. Pp. 19-20.
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the Reisman perspective is rather moderate compared to the demands
of many Israelis and their American supporters, and many Israelis
would find them unacceptable. Thus it would seem to represent a use-
ful step toward "evenhandedness." But I fear that it is a sidestep rather
than a step forward, and that it would not achieve either minimum
order or peace.
III. Feasibility of the Specific Proposals
The history of liberal thinking on war and peace abounds with
assumed conclusions. If only rational leadership prevailed, the com-
mon advantages of cooperation over conflict would be perceived. To
many publicists the key to peace lies in devising specific plans through
which the vision of liberal harmony would prevail. In the Middle East,
economic development and refugee resettlement programs have been
frequently advanced as routes to peace, but they have failed because
their implementation depended upon a prior realization of the goal
they were designed to achieve. The central issue in the Arab-Israeli con-
flict is the conflicting claims to Palestine of Israelis and world Jewry,
on the one hand, and Palestinian Arabs and the Arab "nation," on the
other. Although the Arabs have been beaten three times, each time
more decisively than the last, their claim not only persists but has
gained intensity. Do the Reisman proposals manage to avoid assuming
conclusions and address the main issue? No overall answer is possible.
Each component of his proposal must be examined separately.
A. The Sinai Development Trust (SDT)
The most important of Reisman's separate problems is the conflict
between Egypt and Israel, the two main local powers involved in the
Middle East crisis. His proposal envisages neutralizing Sinai for per-
haps fifty years and establishing an internationally-operated develop.
ment corporation. Enormous amounts of international, Israeli and
Egyptian capital would be poured into this mammoth project to make
the desert bloom; nuclear technology would help make it possible.
When completed, it would revert to Egyptian control, and because of
its location between the two nations, it would serve as a hostage to the
aggressive ambitions of both parties.12
Even if such a program were economically feasible-which is highly
doubtful-it suffers from equally serious political defects. It would re-
12. Chapter II, pp. 23-43.
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quire the most saintly attitudes on both sides to engender the coopera-
tion necessary for such a grandiose scheme. But none is more scathing
than Mr. Reisman himself in depicting the irrationality and avarice
of the Egyptian elite and the unlikelihood that these qualities will dis-
appear. The officers are arms-hungry, Egypt itself is one of the "war-
prone" states, and its ambitions to dominate the area are well-known. 13
If these one-sided characterizations were true, Reisman's assertions that
"Israel's public stance in the Middle East has, since 1948, been non-
expansionist,"14 would not seem enough to persuade the parties to take
the risks entailed by the plan. But it is not necessary to resort to carica-
ture to reveal the flaws in the SDT. The comparatively moderate Egyp-
tian leadership has made major advance concessions to facilitate a dip-
lomatic settlement, but it does seem to have drawn the line at sacrific-
ing Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. Perhaps to Mr. Reisman "returning
the Sinai Peninsula is not the pressing matter,"1 5 but it is very much
on the minds of the Egyptians, and a fifty year freeze on that issue
would seem to be asking a great deal. The toughminded Israeli leader-
ship would be similarly ill-disposed to abandon Israel's de facto sov-
ereignty and security in Sinai merely in the hope that shared material
advantages in the future would destroy the seeds of conflict. As for
the Russians, one would have to push to grotesque extremes the un-
fashionable argument that they want to reduce their presence to en-
visage them acquiescing in the SDT.
B. A Druze Trust Territory
The ethnic ploy is not new in Middle East diplomacy. The French
were among its more notable practitioners during their mandate over
Syria and Lebanon, and they experimented for a time with dividing
Syria into separate autonomous districts in order to repress rising na-
tionalist hostility.1 6 Now that Israel is an occupying power it is not sur-
prising that the doctrine of divide and rule should have some appeal.
Furthermore, the complex political culture of the Arab East supports
such thinking, but not as completely as Mr. Reisman would have us
believe. Anyone who has carefully observed Arab politics since World
War II, if not before it, would be unable to accept Mr. Reisman's
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the ambitions of particular political elites." 17 By the same token, his
conception of Middle Eastern culture as an aggregation of mutually-
hostile, parochial ethnic groups, each with its own subliminal urge for
national sovereignty, distorts and over-simplifies. The actual situation
is more accurately portrayed by Carleton Coon's metaphor of the cul-
tural mosaic: an integrated network of distinct subcommunities living
together by living apart. Although the Druze certainly have a very
strong sense of their special identity, they are hardly as hostile to or
culturally distant from their Arab neighbors as Reisman suggests.
There is no Druze national movement. Druze are not exclusively found
in Golan but also in Syria's Jebel Druze and Lebanon. That the Druze
in Israel have been given special status is not very persuasive evidence
that they will accept a role in legitimizing the dismemberment of Syria.
Many Druze outside Israel have been active in the cause of Arab na-
tionalism in its various forms. The Druze speak Arabic and their re-
ligion, though heterodox, is rooted in Islam.' 3 The Druze-inspired up-
rising against the French mandate in 1925-27 was supported by many
non-Druze elements and has become part of the myth of Arab national-
ist resistance to imperialism. 19
But apart from this serious misperception of Arab political culture,
one must ask whether the application of League of Nations formulas
to the Arab world of the 1970s is feasible. Decades of bitter experience
with western avarice cloaked in the rhetoric of "self-determination"
and "preparation for self-government" have made the Arabs a good
deal less credulous than they were in 1920. More important, the Arabs
-even in defeat by Israel-are not as powerless and structurally under.
developed as they were when the World War I mandates were put
into force. It would be difficult indeed for Arab elites and public
opinion to accept further balkanization of the Arab world.
C. A Jerusalem Statute
Mr. Reisman lays the groundwork for his proposal on Jerusalem by
asserting that the city has far greater religious significance for Jews
than for Muslims or Christians.20 Such an assertion (particularly with
respect to Christianity) is debatable, but even if it should be supported
by an ecumenical panel of theologians it would hardly lessen the in-
17. P. 63. See, e.g., M. BERGER, THE ARAB WORLD TODAY 322-81 (1962) and H. SIIARAIII,
NATIONALISM AND REVOLurION IN THE ARAB WORLD 67-105 (1966).
18. See generally P. Hrrr, THE ORIGINS OF TIlE DRUZE PEOPLE AND RELIGION (1928).
19. See E. MACCALLUM, THE NATIONALIST CRUSADE IN SYRIA chs. 6 & 11 (1928).
20. P. 73.
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tense, deeply-rooted attachment which Muslim and Christian Arabs
hold for the city. Westerners have not paid as much attention as they
should have to the absolutely central importance of the Jerusalem issue
to the Arabs. More than any other aspect of the crisis, it unites Arabs
of all classes, traditions, and ideological persuasion. Whether or not this
passion is commendable or legally or theologically sound, it is a politi-
cal fact, and one does not advance the search for a solution by mini-
mizing it. Jordan's juridical title is as contestable as Israel's, but the
fact that there now may be other Arab (e.g., Palestinian) claimants to
Jerusalem hardly reduces the force of the Arab claim in general-it is
instead evidence that the Arab nation as a whole has a stake in the city.
Under Reisman's plan, a committee of four-representing Israel, Jor-
dan, the Palestinians, and Jerusalem's religious groups-would formu-
late an international statute, with guarantees of religious freedom, that
would place the entire city under a joint mayoral and bicameral coun-
cil system. An Administrative Tribunal would serve as a constitutional
court, with appeal to the International Court of Justice. "Jerusalem
would, then, be an Israeli city, operating under a unique statutory sys-
tem aimed at achieving maximum responsiveness to the needs and
desires of an idiosyncratically mixed population." 2'
This proposal displays the virtue of simultaneously recognizing
Israel's grim determination to retain the Arab city and its inability
to serve as sole custodian of its ecumenical character. It also correctly
recognizes that the sanctity of Jerusalem to Arab Christians and Mus-
lims, just as to Jews, is not a matter of specific holy places alone-rather,
it is a claim to the whole city. Unmentioned but related is the economic
importance of the city as a whole to both contending parties.
Once again, however, the proposed solution turns out to be a thinly
disguised legitimation of Israeli power and influence-or more pre-
cisely, a legitimation of the expulsion of Arab jurisdiction. If the prob-
lem of Jerusalem were essentially a problem of municipal home rule
there would be much to be said for the Jerusalem Statute. But Jerusa.
lem is much more than that, and it is difficult to see how any proposal
that concedes juridical or de facto Israeli rule over the Arab city will
win Arab acceptance.
D. A Palestine State
Reisman's Sinai and Jerusalem proposals are deficient because they
presuppose the sort of political settlement that the proposals themselves
21. P. 79.
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would render unlikely. The Golan proposal would require activating
a Druze national feeling that does not exist through the mechanism
of a trusteeship that is anachronistic in the contemporary Middle East.
But Reisman's proposal for the problem of the Palestinians does not
appear to suffer from these defects. The Palestinian'state would not
presuppose a political settlement; it would be a political settlement.
And it must be considered an interesting one because it would deliver
political benefits to both sides. The Palestinian Arabs, destitute and
exploited, would win tangible new benefits and the Israelis would win
a pacified eastern border with possible access to the Arab hinterland.
Reisman is absolutely right when he declares that "[a]n equitable solu-
tion to the problem of the Palestinian Arabs is not only an exigent
moral demand but also a crucial requirement for increasing stability in
the Middle East.' 22 (It is a pity that he shows less sensitivity to the
non-Palestinian Arab refugees displaced since 1967-over a half-million
Egyptians, according to Egyptian officials, and some 100,000 Syrians,
according to United Nations estimates.) The question of equity is
central. It is also complex. For one thing, today's young Palestinians
are probably more outraged than their fathers at the Zionist takeover
of Palestine. Palestine to them is not the West Bank; it is Jaffa and
Haifa too. Equity to them is the restoration of a land that was usurped
by outsiders with the help of the Great Powers. It has given rise to the
doctrine and activity of Al Fatah, which to Mr. Reisman are "strategic
fantasies" but nonetheless "a highly effective form of group therapy.""
If the Palestinians were alone in their irrendentism, such "fantasies"
might be scant cause for diplomatic or military worry, but the Pales-
tinians are implanted throughout the Arab world and continue to
enjoy a high degree of popular support. This support has not prevented
Arab governments from sacrificing Palestinian values to state interests,
but it has stiffened the Arab backbone and kept the crisis alive. Pales-
tinian organizations have been able to exert a diplomatic force far be-
yond their real power because they have been singularly immune to the
diplomatic conception of equity.
One of America's most distinguished Middle East ambassadors, Ray-
mond A. Hare, has called the Palestinian element the missing piece in
the Middle East puzzle. The remaining problem would be to persuade
the Palestinians to fit into the space allotted them. By early 1972 the
problem had been eased in one sense by the fratricidal strife between
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the latter that it should have been glad to take whatever crumbs the
diplomats might throw. Furthermore, as the resistance's presence inside
Greater Israel (except for Gaza) remained only sporadic, the process
whereby Israel might work out its own separate peace with the Pales-
tinians under its control developed steadily. In another sense, however,
the setbacks to the resistance diminished the Palestinian State as the
"missing piece" and resuscitated Jordan's claim to speak for Trans-
jordanians and Palestinians alike. Thus by 1972 three elements were
contesting for world recognition as legitimate spokesman for the
Palestinians: the traditional West Bank leadership acceptable to Israel,
the Palestinian notables acceptable to Jordan, and the resistance
movement, representing Palestinians elsewhere in the world. Al-
though greatly weakened, the resistance could continue to claim that
it represented the free Palestinians. But if it were to win in the long
run it would have to reassert its striking power and its ability to gal-
vanize the Arab masses, Palestinian and non-Palestinian. Without such
a renewal, it was virtually inconceivable that there would emerge a
redefinition of equity at the diplomatic level more favorable than the
West Bank entity proposal. Neither Israel nor Jordan would be in any
hurry to negotiate the authentic Palestinian goal of a secular, demo-
cratic state in all of Palestine unless compelled by circumstances to
do so.
Reisman's Palestine state proposal has the virtue of facing the prob-
lem, and given the present obstacles facing the Palestinians a develop-
ment along these lines is not impossible. Were a Palestinian settlement
to be worked out, it would clearly reduce the volatility of the crisis as
a whole. Large complex puzzles may be hard to solve but if one can
discover (or invent) the missing piece then the other parts begin to
fall into place. The Palestinians indubitably are at the core of the en-
tire Middle East crisis.
But who speaks for the Palestinians? Unfortunately, Reisman accepts
too easily the assessment or the wish of many "sympathetic" diplomats,
academicians, and journalists that there is a moderate "silent majority"
perhaps best represented by the traditional leadership on both banks
of the Jordan. This view, in my opinion, overemphasizes the war-weari-
ness, organizational incompetence, and basic cooperativeness of the
Palestinians and it too easily dismisses the resistance movement as a
small noisy band of malcontents. If the Palestinians under Israeli and
Jordanian control are silent it may be out of prudence rather than
preference. An alternative assessment holds that the resistance move-
ment remains the most authentic and legitimate voice of the Palestin-
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ians, and that its revolutionary cadres will not only survive but actually
thrive on the present status quo or on any Palestine entity solution now
deemed acceptable by the diplomats. If this alternative is valid then
it is time to begin developing a Palestine solution that involves the
right of return of all Palestinian Arabs to geographic Palestine under a
political system of freedom, communal security, and shared authority-
a system that guarantees the sanctity of Jewish and Arab political iden-
tity symbols and promotes the development of new integrated parties
and groupings.
IV. What Is To Be Done?
The Six-Day War posed two basic diplomatic alternatives; either
return to the pre-June 1967 status quo or attempt to fashion a com-
prehensive solution to the problem. The Soviet Union preferred the
former, the United States the latter. What has developed in the post-
1967 period, however, is neither of these. Rather, we have seen the
new status quo of Greater Israel taking root. Certainly this new status
quo is far preferable to Israel than either of the others. The Soviet
Union also finds that the status quo meets the requirement of per-
petuating a condition of controlled tension. For the United States,
however, the outcome is less satisfactory, for it has lost both friends
and reputation and its interests have fallen in further jeopardy. In
response, a new line has been bruited about, which Mr. Reisman's pro-
posals typify. The key contention is that real peace was impossible
from the start, and that it is naive to seek it. Instead, American policy
should attempt to develop Israel-surrogates in Jerusalem, Sinai, the
West Bank and Golan, and forget once and for all about Governor
Scranton's notion of "evenhandedness." Reisman, to be sure, does not
take this as his goal, and he is far less callous toward the Arabs. Yet
some of his specific proposals, as I have indicated, would produce the
same result. The catch is that the new status quo of a Greater Israel is
certain to be even more unstable than the former one. No sugar-coating
of trusts, trusteeships, municipality formulae, and Bantustans will hide
the reality or neutralize the claims of the Arabs. These devices, how-
ever well-intentioned, satisfy the Israeli demand for peace with security
without adequately addressing the Arabs' demand for justice. By un-
derestimating Arab grievances against Israel, the author diverts atten-
tion from the basic problem, thus making his own relatively apolitical,
legalistic propositions seem more plausible. Reisman uses the bitterness
and irrationality of the local protagonists as a reason for the Powers
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to avoid facing the question of justice squarely, but if he is right about
the intensity of feelings involved, how can we expect success from his
proposals, which merely sidestep those feelings?
What then can be done? I think that we should keep in mind the
following political factors in trying to formulate an answer: the new
status quo is less stable than the old one; the Arabs are not as impotent
or divided on the Palestine question as global strategists may suppose;
Israel cannot have both territories and peace; the Soviet Union benefits
from and wishes to perpetuate a state of controlled tension in which
the United States will continue to suffer from its pro-Israel "tilt"; and
the United States as long as it interprets "evenhandedness" through dis-
torted lenses, risks its interests in the area, jeopardizes the remaining
friendly Arab regimes, and invites the neutralization of its strategic
position in the Mediterranean.
Peace is possible if it is accompanied by justice. The main elements
have been spelled out and are familiar to all. They were enunciated
courageously by Secretary Rogers in December 1969: security, terri-
torial integrity with only insubstantial changes, open watenvays, and
no unilateral takeovers in Jerusalem. The Administration's allusion
to the Palestinian people in February 1970 suggested that it had be-
come officially aware of that crucial missing piece of the puzzle, and
thus had established what must be considered a set of fair working prin-
ciples. These principles are not as pretentious as the Reisman pro-
posals, and are far more just and promising. That American imple-
mentation of these principles has faltered since the Suez cease-fire was
achieved is primarily due to American, not Middle East politics. The
allegedly irrational, small-minded Arab elites were largely won over
through patient and astute American maneuvering. But when it came
to Israel, the Administration lost the will to apply its massive and
unique capabilities for persuasion. Pious apologies to the effect that
we lack the power to persuade Israel are ludicrous; they sound strange
indeed issuing from the pens of otherwise toughminded policymakers
and advisors. After October 1970 it was not Mr. Reisman's Arab world
-that "volatile arena" with its "flaring conflicts of ambition"-that
was obstructing a just settlement. It was simply the government of
Israel. Israel had conducted a masterful policy toward the United
States in which cold war reflexes in our foreign policy establishment
were harnessed to domestic pro-Israel sentiment.
It may be argued that the Soviet Union would never permit or
acquiesce in an evenhanded application of pressure to implement the
Rogers principles. Certainly it was placed on the defensive when those
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principles were first announced, and its reaction, exemplified by its
inflexible stance in the Four Power talks, was hardly encouraging. As
the United States never reached the point of backing its words with
actions, however, we cannot really know what the Russian reaction
would have been. But if those Soviet specialists who feel that the Rus-
sians would like to disengage a bit from their Arab allies are correct,
then the possibility of Soviet cooperation surely exists, particularly if
they could receive at least half the credit for engineering the settle-
ment. To those who argue that the Soviets would balk for fear that
their entire raison d'etre in the Middle East would disappear, it is suf-
ficient to recall that there are several other countries in the Middle
East, such as Iraq and Democratic Yemen, where they would remain
highly competitive, and that the chronic instability of inter-Arab poli-
tics would continue to provide openings-albeit on somewhat less
favorable terms.
Failure to implement a just peace immediately after the 1967 war
gave an enormous impetus to the forces of radical change in the Arab
world, represented mainly by the Palestinian resistance. The guerrilla
challenge was temporarily defused after the September 1970 Jordan
crisis but only with great bloodshed and American aid to King Hus-
sein. Nasser's death created uncertainties over Egypt's future course,
but Anwar Sadat proved, initially at least, an astute successor. Another
moment propitious for implementation of the principles had presum-
ably come. But diplomacy got nowhere in 1971, owing largely to the
paralysis in the implementation of American policy. American plan-
ners allowed themselves to be diverted into working for a Suez Canal
interim settlement which could at best buy only a little more time. The
broader political aspects of the crisis were at least temporarily ignored
-a serious error. The year 1972 began with new promises by Wash-
ington to support Israel with Phantoms and military technology. It
takes no great prophetic gifts to foresee a continuing growth in Arab
militancy, a further weakening of "moderate" Arab leadership in Egypt
and the oil-rich Arabian peninsula. To the extent that pessimism over
the feasibility of a peaceful settlement has slowed the efforts to achieve
one, it has constituted a self-fulfilling hypothesis. Flaccid diplomacy
continues to nurture Arab militance and Israeli obstinacy.
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